The Roots of Protest: Worker Overexploitation and the Transfer of “Reproduction Costs”
The failing of
the social welfare apparatus is not a new issue in the study of Brazilian
political economy. In a 2013 article, economist Niemeyer Almeida-Filho links
current urban discontent to overexploitation of the workforce, and the resulting
concentration of wealth—economic phenomena, he says, that can be traced to the formation
of the Brazilian state in the late nineteenth century.
Simply put,
Almeida-Filho defines overexploitation as occurring when the demands of labor
exceed the cost of the reproduction of that labor—in other words, when workers
are denied “the necessaries absolutely indispensable for living and
multiplying” like housing, health, education, and transportation.[2]
Overexploitation has become characteristic of not only the modern Brazilian
economy but also those of all of Latin America. But this was not always the
case.
Before the
Revolution of 1930, Brazil maintained a system of industrial labor in which “employees
had virtually all of their reproduction costs internalized in the production
structure”—that is to say, companies not only paid their employees wages but
also took charge of their social well-being, establishing “workers’ villages”
which satisfied a variety of needs including “housing, education, health,
welfare and assistance, among other costs” of labor reproduction.[3]
This system, a legacy of the period of slavery, was largely dismantled after
1930, when the costs associated with labor reproduction were “outsourced from
the internal structure of the production company.”[4]
As a result, workers’ wages—which had previously only covered food and
clothing—absorbed other costs of reproduction like “living expenses, security
and welfare, education and health, among others.”[5]
Almeida-Filho traces workforce overexploitation to this radical restructuring
of the Brazilian economy and the emergence of neoliberalism during the first
half of the twentieth century.
Although the
last ten years have seen increases in workers’ wages, these gains have tapered
off as previously stratospheric economic growth has slumped. It is also
important to consider that any recent increases in wages have arisen from a
shockingly low baseline. In January of 2011, President Dilma Rousseff raised the
minimum wage by 9 percent, from 617 reais per month to 678—in American dollars,
the equivalent of a raise from $261 to $287 (by comparison, the French minimum
wage stands at approximately $1900 per month). [6]
To compound the income issue, according to one study, only urban employees, not
agricultural workers, have benefited from “the minimum wage as well as social
and labor legislation.”[7]
In light of the historic outsourcing of reproduction costs from employers to
employees, low wages ensure that many modern Brazilians are unable to meet the
reproduction costs necessary to sustain their current output of labor.
Social Demands: A Reaction to Increasingly Burdensome “Reproduction Costs”?
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When police
brutality and the unprecedented size of the demonstrations attracted national
and international media attention, “the protests spread across the country… gr[owing]
precisely because they were reflecting real public opinion.”[9]
Although media influence and the “Facebookization”[10]
of the movement would ultimately disorganize the demands of protestors, it was
the message embodied by the Free Fare Movement—a message deeply rooted in the
economic theory of “reproduction cost”— that gave rise to this initial proliferation
of protests across Brazil. Transportation ranks among the “reproduction costs”
because it is an activity essential for the procurement and maintenance of a
livelihood. Increases in fares can spell economic catastrophe for urban workers,
whose low incomes do not afford a wide margin of financial security. However,
this reality was perceived not only by working-class Brazilians, but also by
members of the middle class who “would also like to benefit from…public
services in the future.”[11]
Influxes of rural people in search of economic opportunity in urban centers
have only exacerbated shortcomings of the social service apparatus, “leading to
an overall deterioration in the quality of urban life.”[12]
The poor and the bourgeoisie were united not simply by criticism of government
corruption.[13]
They also protested together to call for necessary social improvements that
would benefit Brazilians of all classes.
But
transportation was not the only reproduction cost among protestors’ demands. As
the movement broadened in scale, demands for social reform broadened in scope,
encompassing “concerns over other public services, especially health and
education.” There were also calls to improve urban security, public services,
and living conditions.[14]
Criticisms of excessive spending on infrastructure and facilities for the 2014
World Cup and 2016 Olympics were juxtaposed with the lack of spending on social
programs and infrastructure, like “education and hospitals” (see the photo of
two protestors’ evocative placards above). According to one study, in Brazil as
much as “half of the federal budget is absorbed in the service of the domestic
public debt,” which “dwarfs” social spending.[15]
Jaime Oliva and
Aline Khoury of the Institute of Brazilian Studies at the University of São
Paulo contend that the “biggest complaints” expressed during the June-July
protests— “top-down modifications” of public transportation and “excessive” spending
on sporting events— demonstrate the Brazilian people’s need to become “the
protagonist of public policies…not just their adjuvant.” In the context of
economic theory, however, it seems that Brazilians objected to changes in
public transport not because they were “top-down” (in fact, they originated in
the municipal government and were announced by city mayor Fernando Haddad) but because the
increases posed adverse economic consequences for many urban Brazilians.
Spending on sporting facilities only seemed “excessive” in light of underfunded
social programs first instituted to satisfy needs that had, historically, been
met by “workers’ villages.” Perhaps the protests of 2013 are less a reflection
of the current ailments of an overmighty federal administration as much as a reaction
to the seventy-year-old gap in social services that has yet to be adequately
filled by the neoliberal Brazilian state.
[1]
Saad-Filho, Alfredo. "Mass Protests under "Left Neoliberalism":
Brazil, June-July 2013 ." Critical
Sociology. no. 5 (2013): 659.
[2]
Sitton, John. Marx Today: Selected
Works and Recent Debates. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 119.
[3] Almeida-Filho, Niemeyer. "Overexploitation of the Workforce and Concentration of Wealth: Key Issues for Development Policy in Brazilian Peripheral Capitalism." World Review of Political Economy. Vol.4. no. 1 (2013), 4-21.
[4]
Ibid., 16
[5]
Ibid., 16
[6]
See Reuters, Global Minimum Wage feature:
http://www.reuters.com/subjects/global-minimum-wage
[7]
Almeida-Filho, 16
[8]
Saad-Filho, Alfredo. "Mass Protests under "Left Neoliberalism":
Brazil, June-July 2013 ." Critical
Sociology. no. 5 (2013): 657-669.
[9]
Oliva, Jaime, and Aline Khoury. "Renewal of Democracy in Brazil's
Protests." Economic and
Political Weekly. no. 29 (2013): 1-6.
[10]
Saad-Filho, 659
[11]
Ibid., 662
[12]
Ibid., 661
[13]
Saad-Filho writes “Yet these groups…protest together because of their
perception of dysfunctionality and corruption in state institutions.”
[14]
Ibid., 663
[15]
Ibid., 662
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